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AN AMERICAN LAWYER LOOKS AT
CIVIL JURY TRIAL IN SCOTLAND *
PA-L HARDIN, III t
Whatever may be the dangers of comparing supposedly analogous
aspects of vastly different legal systems, every graduate of a good
American law school knows the value of comparing essentially similar
systems that have particular differences. That is the very stuff of
legal education in this country, whose fifty states have independent but
sibling legal institutions. If, however, as I suggest, apples are more
profitably compared with other apples than with oranges, American
lawyers might well despair of gaining immediately relevant insights
about our rules of civil procedure and evidence from study abroad.
Civil justice in America still revolves around the jury, while else-
where, as we have recently been reminded,' the jury as a means of
resolving civil disputes has virtually disappeared.
Virtually, but not quite. There is at least one country-more
precisely one city-outside the United States where an American jury
lawyer can, once he gets used to wigs and gowns, feel completely at
home. That city is Edinburgh, Scotland. Jury trials in the sheriff
courts scattered throughout Scotland are infrequent,2 but each year
many actions for personal injury or death are brought to Edinburgh
for jury trial in the Court of Session 3 There, the Faculty of Ad-
* This Article was prepared by the author for the Comparative Study of the
Administration of Justice, established under the terms of a grant from the Ford
Foundation to Loyola University School of Law (Chicago), and is published here
with the consent of the Study. All rights are reserved by the Study.
" Associate Professor of Law, Duke University; Visiting Associate Professor of
Law, 1962-63, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1954, Duke University.
The author is indebted to Mr. Ian Murray, Advocate, and Mr. William Prosser,
Advocate, both of Edinburgh, Scotland, for valuable research assistance in the prepa-
ration of this Article.
SJOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 59 (1962).
2 In the 12 "busier" sheriff courts, only 61 cases were tried to juries from 1949
through 1958. Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Civil
Jury Trial in Scotland Report, CMD. No. 851, appendix E (1959).
3 During the period 1954-1958, the number of cases actually disposed of by jury
trial in the Court of Session varied annually from 86 to 104, and 395 jury cases
awaited trial in the Court of Session at the beginning of April, 1958. Id. at 11. The
Report also contains a brief summary of the history and present condition of civiljury trial in Scotland. The Committee recommended retention of jury trial in the
Court of Session, but its abolition in the sheriff courts. A minority of the Committee
favored doing away with the civil jury altogether. "We think it would be paradoxical
if Scotland should retain an imported institution when it is in decline in England
where it is indigenous." Id. at 37.
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vocates-probably numbering fewer than 100 advocates in active prac-
tice-constitute perhaps as busy a body of jury lawyers as may be
found anywhere outside our own country.-
I spent last summer observing jury trials in Scotland, talking with
lawyers and judges there, and reading what I could find on their rules
of procedure and evidence. I discovered some intriguing differences
between Scottish and American practice, rendered all the more pungent
by the startling similarity in the respective basic institutions of civil
justice. The purpose of this Article is to outline briefly and informally
a few of the areas in which Scottish practice diverges from our own,
and in which American lawyers might find interesting and helpful
comparisons. For the sake of convenience and general interest, the
comparisons will be made chiefly in terms of personal injury cases.
I. PLEADING AND OTHER PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
Although I shall be dealing for the most part with the trial stage
of litigation, I first want to touch lightly on some pretrial problems.
Judged by American standards of reformed procedure, pleading
and other pretrial mechanisms in Scotland are old fashioned. Dis-
covery techniques are not streamlined, pretrial hearings as we know
them are not utilized, and the pleadings carry most of the burden of
framing the issues and giving notice of facts to be proved at trial.5
The pursuer's (plaintiff's) initial pleading is called the summons.
It contains, in addition to certain formal parts, the "conclusions"
(prayer for relief), the "condescendences" (allegations of facts giving
rise to the suit, set forth in numbered paragraphs), and the "pleas in
law" (legal propositions relied upon in support of the conclusions).O
Thus, the pursuer has to state his claim in considerable factual and
legal detail. As one would suspect, this means that a considerable
amount of court time is consumed by the Scottish equivalent of our de-
4 The Scottish bar is divided; only advocates are permitted to appear in the
Court of Session.
ZiWe are fortunate in having available in this country a thorough exposition of
Scottish pleadings. Millar, Civil Pleading in Scotland (pts. 1-2), 30 MicH. L. REV.
545, 709 (1932). This article was prepared with the assistance of the then Lord
President of the Court of Session, and was hailed in Scotland as perhaps being a
fuller study than anything which had been published in Scotland up to that time.
Note, An American Lawyer's Impression of Scottish Pleading, 1933 ScoTs L.T. 137.
The following articles and note may help to convey the Scots' own impressions of
Scottish pleading. Blades, The Art of Pleading (pts. 1-2), 64 Scot. L. REV. 25, 53
(1948) ; Walker, Pleadings in Negligence, 72 Sco. L. Ray. 241 (1956); Note, The
Riqht to Amend, 67 Scot. L. REv. 212 (1951).
6 See Cleary, The Uses of Pleading, 40 Ky. L.J. 46, 54 (1951); Millar, supra
note 5, at 740.
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murrer practice,' and that too much trial time is spent in quibbling over
whether or not the pursuer's averments give proper notice of lines of
evidence and legal theories sought to be developed at trial. If this
seems archaic when compared with practice under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it is little different from and no worse than pleading
practice in many of our states.
But all of this is by way of leading up to something that is
unique. The defender's (defendant's) pleading must deal with each
allegation of fact in the summons in a manner quite similar to special
denial practice under the Federal Rules. That is, the defender, in a
separate numbered answer for each of the pursuer's numbered con-
descendences, answers every material allegation as either "admitted,"
"denied," or "not known and not admitted." These correspondingly
numbered answers may also contain new matter, averred by way of
explaining or avoiding the pursuer's allegations. After the defenses
are served, the pursuer prepares what is known as "the open record"
(pronounced re-cord'). This is best described as an integrated repro-
duction of the summons and defenses, including conclusions, pleas in
law, and the like, but also containing the condescendences of the pur-
suer and the answers of the defender set out in parallel-condescendence
(1) followed by answer (1), condescendence (2) followed by answer
(2), and so on.
Now the fun begins. Even before he serves a copy of the open
record on the defender, the pursuer's counsel, in the light of the de-
fender's answers and, possibly, of further investigation of the case,
makes certain "adjustments" in his condescendences. He does this
by interlining a word, phrase, or sentence here and there, using perhaps
blue ink. The defender's counsel, who has seen the pursuer's adjust-
ments and has also had a chance to look into the case a bit further,
then makes adjustments in his answers, being careful to use, say, red
ink. This process goes merrily on, back and forth, usually for four
weeks, unless counsel sooner exhaust either their ingenuity or their
vari-colored inks. After this period of informal and completely un-
supervised amendment of the pleadings, the court "closes the record." 8
The pursuer then has the onus of preparing a document known as
the "closed record." This is simply a clean reproduction of the by
7The Scottish "plea to the relevancy" of the pursuer's summons is not an exact
equivalent of the demurrer, as it is pleaded along with, rather than in advance of,
the factual defenses. Millar, supra note 5, at 568, 742.
SThe case is actually called at the end of two weeks, but one continuance is
allowed as a matter of course. The period of adjustment may be continued after
the second fortnight, but only on cause shown. In practice, the adjustment period
is almost always four weeks. See CT. oF SEss. R. 115, 116; Note, Adjustment of
Record, 1932 ScoTs L.T. 73.
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now colorfully marked-up open record; it embodies the pleadings in
final form, save the possibility of amendment by opening up the closed
record-an expensive process which is much less flexible than
"adjustment." 9
Do any useful insights for the American lawyer lurk in this
unique procedure? Happily, most of our cases nowadays encounter
little delay or difficulty at the pleading stage, but instead are at issue
in a matter of weeks.'0 This is in part the result of reforms in the
formal rules of pleading; but, particularly in metropolitan litigation
centers, pleading shortcuts and efficiencies seem also to have developed-
spontaneously, without sweeping revision of rules and statutes. To
adopt matter-of-course revision of the pleadings in the Scottish fashion
would be to take a giant step backward." On the other hand, not all
American cases are yet free from pleading troubles. Even in metro-
politan areas, some cases bog down in a morass of pleading com-
plications; 12 and this is presumably the fate of a greater percentage
of cases in rural counties of states which have not adopted liberal
pleading rules. The Scottish experience with record adjustment at
least demonstrates that most preliminary skirmishes at the pleading
stage can be handled by the lawyers, more or less informally, without
costly court supervision, and also without proliferation of documents
in the file. Paradoxically, even as we have de-emphasized pleadings,
we have saddled our judges with potentially troublesome supervisory
duties related to the pleadings." On the other hand, the Scots, who
still attach great importance to pleading, seem to get along nicely with-
out court supervision until matters have been pretty thoroughly aired.
I have already indicated that discovery procedures in Scotland
are not as well developed as in the United States. Depositions and
interrogatories, which are routinely used here, are available in Scot-
tish practice only to preserve the testimony of a prospective witness
who is aged or dying, or who is outside of or about to leave the juris-
9 Professor Sunderland has d~scribed the hearing at which the Court of Session
closes the record as an early instance of pretrial hearings. Sunderland, The Theory
and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REv. 215, 220 (1937). By like
token, the closed record can be analogized in a limited way to our pretrial order, as
it governs the subsequent conduct of the case. It must be recognized, however, that
this is a rudimentary pretrial hearing only, at which little more is done than to settle
pleadings.
Amendment after the record is closed is dealt with in CT. OF SEss. R 117.
1o See, e.g., LEvIN & WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF Ju-
DIcIAL ADmINISTRATiON IN PENNSYLVANIA 256-57, 296 (1961).
11 Pleading reform had so far progressed in this country that Professor Millar
was able to make this point a full generation ago. Millar, supra note 5, at 738-39.
1 2 See, e.g., LEVIN & WooI=Y, op. cit. upra note 10, at 258-62.
13 See FED. P_ Civ. P. 7(a); CHADBOURN & LEvIN, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
351 (1961).
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diction. 4 There is a device in Scotland for the discovery of documents,
whether in the hands of parties or non-parties, 5 but its scope is strictly
limited by the averments in the record. One case which I observed
illustrates this point. Rather close to trial, the defender was informed
that the pursuer had, at a prior time in life, sustained injuries that were
very similar to those which he now claimed were recently caused by
the defender's misconduct. Before the defender could discover the
hospital records relating to the earlier injuries, he had to move the
court to open the closed record so that he could insert in his answers
"on belief" a specific averment of facts to support his request for pro-
duction of the documents. This procedure, of course, is awkward and
time consuming. Furthermore, there is always the danger that the
court will not permit a party to amend the record, on the ground that
he is merely attempting to insert random averments so as to have "a
fishing search." 16
Nonetheless, the Scots have certain pretrial practices with respect
to documentary and real evidence that tend to minimize surprise at the
trial and to streamline the ultimate handling of "productions" in court.
The first of these is the requirement that any party who intends to
introduce documents, plans, maps, models, and other productions must
"lodge them in process" at least one week before trial, or later by
leave of court.' This means that these items must be filed in court
and thus made available for inspection by the opposing party. Further-
more, items which are so lodged acquire identifying numbers, making
it quite easy for lawyers and court officials to keep track of things and
call them to the attention of witnesses. Incidentally, documents which
lawyers plan to use solely for impeachment of witnesses need not be
lodged in advance of trial; 18 so a possibility of surprise is preserved
in an area in which it may be thought to be legitimate.
A second pretrial device that serves to streamline the introduction
of documentary evidence is called a "minute of admissions." 9  The
14 The Evidence (Scotland) Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 112; LEWIS, MANUAL
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN SCOThAND 181, 184 (1925). See also Millar, supra
note 5, at 745.
15 By written specification of the documents desired, a party craves the court
to grant "commission and diligence" for their recovery. CT. or SEss. R. 120-123.
Rule 125 provides that a party can demand that his opponent admit the date, signature,
transmission, receipt of any relevant document, or tl-e verbal accuracy of any copy
under penalty of having to pay the expense of proof rendered necessary by refusal
to admit.
16 Pattinson v. Robertson, [1843-44] Sess. Cas. 944, 951 (Scot. 2d Div. 1844).
It was interesting to learn that the Scots also apply the fishing metaphor when they
do not approve of discovery.
17 CT. OF Sass. R. 129.
is Paterson & Sons v. Kit Coffee Co., 16 Scots L.T.R. 180 (1908) ; LEWIs, op.
cit. supra note 14, at 189-90.
19 CT. op Sass. R. 142.
1963]
744 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
major contribution of this paper, prepared by counsel just before trial,
is to eliminate or diminish tiresome authentication at trial of writings,
photographs, and the like. Naturally, there are occasional fights over
the authenticity of documents, but no more than seem to occur in
American jurisdictions utilizing pretrial hearings. Thus, for example,
when it becomes desirable to refer to the hospital records in a personal
injury case, counsel will simply ask whatever witness he has on the
stand to "refer to number 11 of process, if you please." A court official
will then hand the hospital file to the witness, and counsel can directly
begin his substantive questioning. He does not have to put a custodian
witness on the stand to establish that these are indeed the hospital
records pertaining to the treatment of the pursuer.
One other Scottish pretrial procedure will no doubt provoke
mixed reactions in the United States. If, as trial approaches, the
defender feels that he may go down to defeat, he may lodge a
"tender"- a written offer to the pursuer to pay a certain sum in
settlement of the claim. If the pursuer rejects the tender and ultimately
recovers a verdict in a sum no greater than the amount of the tender,
he will be charged with all expenses of the litigation after the date
of tender. ° This Scottish rule is similar to statutory provisions in
some of our states. 1 It is more potent, however, in that expenses in
all Scottish civil cases include lawyers' fees. The rule of tender may
appear at first blush to favor defenders because it obviously places great
pressure on pursuers to accept these formal settlement offers. How-
ever, pursuers need feel no pressure to accept unreasonable offers, and
there seems to be agreement that the device encourages defenders to
make fair proposals. 22  Both the taxation of reasonable attorneys' fees
as part of court costs and the adoption of a tender rule are worthy of
serious consideration in the United States2
2 0 MACLAREN, ExPENsEs N THE SUPREME COURT AND TRE SHERIFF CoURTS oF
SCOTLAND 81 (1912). See also Ramsay v. Souter, [1863-64] Sess. Cas. 891, 892
(Scot 2d Div. 1864).
2 1See Note, 53 CoLum. L. REV. 78, 86 (1953).
2 Note, Scottish Practice as to Tenders it Libel Actions, 1933 Scors L.T. 49.
2 3 Professor McCormick has argued ably in support of taxing attorneys' fees as
part of court costs:
Upon balancing the opposing considerations, it seems probable that the
English practice, which allows reimbursement with fair completeness of coun-
sel fees and actual expenses in favor of the successful party, is more just and
equitable than the American rule limiting recovery to the inadequate arbi-
trary statutory scale of costs, and has a greater tendency to lessen the flow
of litigation.
McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES 255 (1935) ; see Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the
Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUm. L. Rxv. 78, 94 n.126 (1953).
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II. THE TRIAL
A. Selecting the Jury
Scottish counsel have very little to do with the selection of jurors.
The court clerk ballots the jurors by drawing slips from a box and
asking the persons whose names and numbers are drawn to take their
places in the jury box. Each side does have four peremptory chal-
lenges,2" but they are exercised most unobtrusively, if at all. If an
advocate wishes to challenge a juror, he simply will nod to the clerk
when he hears the name of that juror called. The clerk will then say
to the juror, "You needn't come," and draw another name. This goes
on until twelve jurors have been successfully ballotted from the panel
of 36. Theoretically, there can be challenges for cause,25 but they prac-
tically never occur. Indeed, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise,
for counsel do not have the privilege of questioning the panel or even of
asking the court to question them.26 Apparently, all that the advocates
have to go on is a list of the 36 prospective jurors, indicating the occu-
pations of those who are employed. Since the peremptory challenges
are frequently exercised on the basis of the professions or occupations
of the jurors, more men than women are challenged. The result is that
women outnumber men on many juries even though the ballot box
originally contains the names of 18 men and 18 women."
I doubt that the Scots lose much in foregoing the ancient and
honorable rite of examining the jury panel. Certainly there is a con-
sistent gain offsetting any occasional disadvantage; the jury is ready
to take its oath and hear the case two to five minutes after the ballotting
begins.
B. The Rules of Evidence
After the jury has been sworn and has heard a brief opening
statement by the pursuer's counsel, the time comes for the "leading"
of evidence." The rules governing the introduction of evidence in
Scotland and America present some interesting comparisons.
24 Jury Trials (Scotland) Act, 1815, 55 Geo. 3, c. 42, § 21.
25 Ibid.
26 1 have found no direct authority holding that counsel may not examine jurors.
Scottish lawyers agree, however, that it is not done, and suggest as indirect authority
that the statutes that authorize and refer to challenge make no reference to examina-
tion. E.g., Jury Trials (Scotland) Act, 1815, 55 Geo. 3, c. 42, § 21; Court of Ses-
sion Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 100, § 44 (Scot).27 CT. OF SESS. P- 138(c).
28 The defender's opening statement is postponed until after the pursuer has led
his evidence, in contrast to the practice in some American states.
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1. The Oath
Oral testimony of sworn witnesses presented during examination
and cross-examination in open court is the accepted method of proof
in Scotland, as in the United States. 9  Perhaps I should, therefore,
at least touch upon the oath, for there is reason to believe that if the
witness' oath ever achieves the desired effect, it does so in the Court
of Session. In the first place, the oath has an optional clause, much
used in Edinburgh, that portends doom for the false swearer.3 (The
unbeliever and the witness whose beliefs forbid oathtaking may, of
course, affirm.) "' In the second place, the oath is administered, not
by the clerk in a singsong voice, but by His Lordship, who stands and
stretches his own right hand high in company with the witness as he
solemnly intones. Perjury doubtless occurs in Scotland, but it must
be attended by considerable uneasiness when the oath has been ad-
ministered as I heard it done, for example, by Lord Milligan of the
Court of Session.
Able-bodied witnesses stand throughout the giving of their testi-
mony in Scotland. This also contributes to an atmosphere that seems
rather more solemn than the atmosphere surrounding American jury
trials.
2. Out-of-Court Statements of the Dead and Insane
Perhaps my most exciting discovery in Scotland was the fact that
the Scots readily admit, as an exception to the rule against hearsay,
the out-of-court statements of persons who are dead at the time of
trial.32 The only requisites to admission are, first, that the declarant
would be a competent witness and his statement admissible if he were
present to testify, and, second, that the statement be nonlitigious-that
is, not made expressly for use in litigation.' There is authority that
supports the admission, under the same enlightened rule, of statements
29 Mackay, Evidence and Procedure it Scotland: A Comparison With England,
14 MoDmxR L. REV. 162, 170 (1951).
30 The optional clause is printed here in brackets: "I swear by Almighty God
[and as I shall answer to God at the great day of judgment] that I will tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 116. In Edinburgh, of course, "truth" sounds more like "trrruth," which makes
it all the more impressive to the tourist, though probably not to the Scotsman in the
witness box.
31 The Oaths Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 46. See generally Note, Upon Your
Oath, 77 ScoT. L. Rxv. 101 (1961).
32 LEwIs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 133; BELL, PRiNcnr.Is OF THE LAW OF ScoT-
LAND § 2259 (1899) ; DICKSON, A TREATISE: ON THE LAW OF EVIDENcE IN SCOTLAND§266 (1887).
s LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 133, 136.
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of persons who are hopelessly insane at the time of trial 4 What can
one say at this point but "Bravo !"
3. "De Recenti" Statements
Another rule involving hearsay implications-and a rule of some
practical importance in Scottish personal injury cases-concerns "de
recenti" statements. When a party to a civil case, or a prosecuting
witness in a criminal case, has been injured, evidence that immediately
or very shortly after his injury he reported or complained of it is ad-
missible if the party or prosecuting witness has first taken the stand
himself and given testimony concerning the occurrence.'- The doc-
trine was very early extended to admit evidence of de recenti state-
ments of a child witness who testifies concerning crimes or other
occurrences, even though the child may not have been injured in any
way.36 "In order that the de recenti statement may become admissible,
substantive evidence of the transaction or offense to which the state-
ment is referable must to some extent first be led." " I was told by
Scottish advocates that the statements are admitted only to bolster
the credibility of the party, prosecuting witness, or child. The au-
thorities, however, do not clearly state this limitation and in some
passages even seem to belie it 3 8
If the rule operates to admit de recenti statements as substantive
evidence, I feel it has much to commend it. Such fresh statements of
an interested party or witness are more likely t6 be true than their
testimony at trial. But I would approve of the rule even if it has
only the limited purpose of bolstering the credibility of witnesses. It
would be a useful antidote to whatever tendencies jurors might have to
discredit the testimony of complainants in injury cases and of child
witnesses in general. Incidentally, no Scottish lawyer with whom I
spoke was in the least disturbed by what would undoubtedly cause dis-
may in some courts in this country, the fact that the rule permits the
introduction of de recenti statements supporting the credibility of a
witness before his credibility has been attacked. The de recenti rule
may remind American lawyers of our narrower rule relating to
4Id. at 134.
35Id. at 326; DICKSON, op. cit. supra note 32, § 258.
86H.M.A. v. Stewart, 2 Irvine 166, 179 (Scot. High Ct. 1855).
87 Lmvis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 326.
38 DicKsoN, op. cit. supra note 32, § 258 states that de recenti statements can
constitute corroboration under the rule discussed infra in the text. This clearly
implies substantive use. Furthermore, the text writers all seem to treat the doctrine
as involving an exception to the hearsay rule, which is at least a debatable point if
it is not being used to prove the truth of the matters asserted.
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"outcry" in rape cases, about which there is even similar confusion as
to whether or not the statements come in as substantive evidence.39
4. Corroboration
Potentially the most important difference between the rules of
evidence in Scotland and the United States is that in the former
country the uncorroborated testimony of one witness is not sufficient
to make out a civil or criminal case.40 In other words, the essential
elements of a case must be proved by evidence from more than one
source, or, applying the rule to personal injury cases, the pursuer must
produce either an eyewitness or some circumstantial evidence to sup-
port his own testimony on every essential fact.4 I speak of this dif-
ference as potentially important because I do not know how strictly the
rule is applied. However, I doubt that the corroboration requirement
would or should be looked upon with favor in the United States. If
corroboration is easily "found," as it seemed to be in the civil cases
which I observed, it would only be a nuisance. On the other hand,
if the rule has real force in practice, it must make some meritorious
personal injury and death claims virtually impossible to establish.42
5. The Scope of Cross-Examination
American courts disagree on whether the cross-examination of a
witness should be limited in scope to matters raised on direct examina-
tion or whether it may properly extend to all matters relevant to the
controversy. How strange to a Scotsman the restrictive or federal rule
39 Professor McCormick reports that courts frequently say that the victim's
complaint made soon after an alleged rape comes in solely to support credibility, but
expresses his own view that this rationale "is a modern sophistication designed to
reconcile the admission of this ancient evidence of 'hue and cry' with the modern ban
upon hearsay. To say that prompt complaint does not substantively strengthen the
state s case runs counter to common sense." MCCORMICK, EvmEcE § 49, at 109-10
n.27 (1954).
40 Stewart v. City of Glasgow, [19581 Sess. Cas. 28 (Scot. 1st Div. 1957);
LEwIs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 246; BELL, op. cit. supra note 32, § 2257.41 The second source need not be direct evidence of a second witness; it may
be circumstantial. "In this matter the substance rather than the form should be
regarded, and wherever the evidence truly depends on the observation, memory, or
truthfulness of one person alone, it is to be regarded as the testimony of a single
witness." LEwIs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 246.
42An Englishman, commenting on corroboration in Scotland, took a less jaun-
diced view. "In any event, the corroboration rule, although at times decried and at
times leading to mere mechanical repetition, has still got its uses if applied with
discretion." Mackay, Evidence and Procedure in Scotland: A Comparison With
England, 14 MODERN L. REv. 162, 171 (1951).
In criminal cases, the corroboration rule may have both importance and merit in
the prosecution of serious offenses. See Wilson, The Logic of Corroboration, 76
ScoT. L. Rrv. 101 (1960). However, it seems unnecessarily inefficient for lesser
crimes. An almost ludicrous illustration of this is the fact that traffic wardens in
Edinburgh work in pairs in order to get convictions for overtime parking.
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must seem. Not only may a party to a Scottish case cross-examine
opposing witnesses on matters not explored on examination-in-chief,
but he must do so as to essential elements of his own case about which
the witnesses would be expected to know, or risk being barred from
proving those facts by his own witnesses.43 In a case arising out of
an automobile accident, for example, if the defender expects to show
that a third automobile was present and contributed in some way to
the accident, he must ask the pursuer and his witnesses about the
presence and role of the third car. If he omits this line of inquiry, the
court will not permit him to question his own witnesses about it when
he later presents his case.
This cross-examination rule, to the extent that it eliminates the
need for rebuttal testimony, promotes trial efficiency. On the other
hand, it clearly undercuts whatever tactical advantage defenders could
otherwise enjoy by presenting their own theories initially through
friendly witnesses. I view the open American rule, applied with dis-
cretion, as a desirable middle point between the Scottish rule and the
restrictive American rule.
6. Post-Accident Safety Measures
One further difference between Scottish and American rules of
evidence lies in the area of post-accident safety measures. American
courts have almost universally excluded proof of repairs to defendants'
machinery or premises following an accident when the evidence is
offered to show negligence generally.44 Such proof is thought to have
little or no logical tendency to show that the particular defendant was
unreasonable in failing to discover and guard against the danger before
the accident.45 Courts and commentators who have difficulty with this
relevancy argument still accept the exclusionary rule on the ground
that to admit such evidence might discourage the taking of steps to
remove a danger.46  Administering the rule, however, involves some
difficulty, because the evidence is unquestionably admissible for limited
purposes, such as to show ownership or control of the premises or to
show the feasibility of taking safety precautions 7  If, therefore, we
43 Whenever it is intended to lead evidence to contradict what a witness
has stated in his examination-in-chief, or to explain facts known to him
thtgh not so spoken by him, care must be taken to cross-examine the wit-
ness upon the facts as they are subsequently proved. Failure to do so miy
disentitle the party to lead evidence of the facts he wishes to prove.
LEwis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 226. (Emphasis added.) See also Stewart v. City
of Glasgow, [1958] Sess. Cas. 28, 38 (Scot. 1st Div. 1957).
42 WIMORE, EVIDENcE § 283 (3d ed. 1940).
45 M0RRis, TORTS 51 (1952).
46 McCoRmicIC, EVIDENCE § 77, at 159 (1954).
47Ibid.; MoRRsS, TORTS 52-54 (1952).
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could determine that the rule of exclusion is practically impotent or
unnecessary in the matter of encouraging repairs, and if we had some
assurance that juries could be trusted not to give evidence of repairs
more weight than it logically merits, we might give serious thought to
reform. At this point, Scottish law and practice seem to offer rather
important insights.
In Scotland, where the majority of jury cases involve claims by
employees against employers for injuries sustained at work,4" it is
customary for the parties to inquire of witnesses what was done follow-
ing the accident with respect to the allegedly offending machinery,
platform, or what have you. This evidence is freely admitted, without
limiting instructions.49 Scottish lawyers were surprised when I told
them that we exclude this kind of evidence for fear that juries might
misuse it and for fear that its admission would discourage defendants
from taking valuable post-accident safety precautions. The consensus
among the Scots was that jurors do not pay much attention to this
sort of evidence and that the practice of admitting it does not inhibit
repairs.
This comparison suggests that our rule may be based upon an
ill-founded fear of prejudice and that it may even be working in "re-
verse." Scottish lawyers insist that they do not caution their clients
to postpone repairs, even though evidence of them will be admitted.
On the other hand, it is well known that American lawyers sometimes
advise clients to put off certain improvements until after trial, just to
be extra safe, lest the remedial measures should somehow come to the
attention of the jury and be given undue weight. How strange it
would be to discover that excluding evidence of post-accident repairs so
as not to discourage them actually does tend to discourage them by
building up in the minds of defendants' lawyers an exaggerated fear
of jury prejudice. In other words, perhaps we have so feared prejudice
and so mistrusted the rule with its various exceptions that we have
in a measure defeated the very laudable policy which the rule theoret-
ically serves.
C. Tradition of Restraint in Objecting
A striking difference is observable between Scotland and the
United States in the admission and exclusion of evidence that has
48 0f the 395 jury cases awaiting trial in the Court of Session in April, 1958,
280 were master and servant cases, while 86 were road traffic cases. Civil Jury Trial
in Scotland Report, op. cit. supra note 2, at 11.
4 9 My only direct authority for this statement is my own observation, supported
by discussion with advocates. I can cite as implied authority the absence of any
treatment of this subject in the texts which I read. Apparently, admissibility of
post-accident repairs is not questioned in Scotland today.
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nothing to do with the "rules" governing admissibility. Scottish law-
yers are far more restrained in objecting to offers of evidence by their
opponents than are their American counterparts. I am bound to say
that Scottish lawyers themselves insist that the practice varies from
advocate to advocate, and we all know that the propensities of Ameri-
can lawyers in this regard range from extreme laissez faire to picayunish
carping. Furthermore, my observations in Edinburgh lasted only a
few weeks. On the other hand, the paucity of objections attracted my
attention in the first case that I observed, and I paid closer attention
to this feature of the trials than perhaps to any other. I therefore have
some confidence in the soundness of my generalization and am sure
that the unusual tolerance of Scottish advocates in this respect has
important practical consequences.
Before attempting to illustrate my point, I should note one ex-
ception to it, which was obliquely referred to in the discussion of
pleadings. Quibbling at trial is frequent on the one question of whether
or not the closed record gives fair notice of the facts sought to be
proved by particular testimony or by a certain document. I heard, on
the average, five or six such objections in each civil jury trial that I
observed. This was, however, the only ground on which any evidence
was objected to in several trials; I sat occasionally for three or four
consecutive days without hearing, for example, a single hearsay ob-
jection, despite constant violation.
The theory concerning leading questions is the same in Scotland
as in America. On direct examination, leading questions generally
may not be asked except as a time-saving device in bringing out
preliminary or uncontested matters.Y° In practice, however, there are
far more leading questions asked and far fewer objections interposed
in Scotland than in this country, even when counsel are asking about
matters that are hotly debated and crucial to the case. When oppos-
ing counsel's patience is finally exhausted, instead of objecting and
seeking to have the question disallowed, he is apt simply to rise and
say resignedly, "Question and answer." When I observed that the
judges never made any ruling at this point, I was told that no ruling
is expected. The "question and answer" formula has been carried
over from non-jury cases; apparently, its main purpose is to cause the
shorthand reporter to record the particular question and answer
verbatim, rather than to lump them into the commonly used para-
phrased narrative form. This enables the appellate court to see the
manner in which the testimony was elicited and, hopefully, to weigh
50 Lwis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 217; DicKsoN, op. cit. .Spra note 32, §§ 1771-73;
Bishop v. Bryce, [1910] Sess. Cas. 426, 431 (Scot. 1st Div.).
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it accordingly. But even this mild sort of protest is infrequently
made, and orthodox objections to leading questions are rarer still.
Notwithstanding my distaste for repeated objections to the form
of questions, I have reason to believe that in this particular area of
leading questions, Scottish leniency has led to sloppy practice. Cer-
tainly there was little effort on the part of many advocates whom I
observed to avoid leading. Testimony on the most crucial matters
seemed antiseptic and not very persuasive, even when witnesses were
obviously articulate and could have made a fine impression under
proper interrogation.51 I am inclined to believe that the failure to
appreciate the tactical advantages of non-leading interrogation is re-
lated in some way to this tradition of withholding objections to leading
questions.
In theory, the opinion rule also operates in Scotland just as in
the United States. Lay witnesses should testify to facts, not opinions.52
Opinion testimony is especially proscribed on matters near the heart
of the controversy--questions of ultimate fact or mixed law and fact.
It seems to be settled, for example, that "a witness may not be asked
whether a certain person acted with propriety." " The Scottish tradi-
tion of restraint in objecting, however, effectively liberalizes the
opinion rule, just as it does the leading question rule. For example, I
saw two cases tried on successive days in which the pursuers were
workers claiming to have been injured at their jobs as a result of
breaches of duty by their employers. In both cases, substantially the
following testimony was elicited without objection.
Counsel: Do you consider that the place where you were
working was a safe place to work?
Pursuer: No.
Counsel: Would it have been practicable for your employer
to take measures to make the place safe?
Pursuer: Yes.
51 The best example is taken from a criminal trial which I observed. The crown
called to the stand a poised and bright looking young police constable, who with his
fellow officers had allegedly been assaulted by the prisoners in the dock. The pro-
curator-fiscal was not content with leading his witness through introductory matter.
When he reached the really exciting details of the fight, he was still looking down
at his notes of earlier interviews with the witness and carrying on in a rather bored
manner: "I believe, Constable Riekes, that it was at this time that a tall youth in
a dark suit jumped on you from behind and wrestled you to the ground." And so
it went, the prosecutor "testifying" and the witness being all but wasted except for
looking neat in his uniform and occasionally nodding or murmuring acquiescence to
the unfolding story. This probably saves time, but the jury does not get a spontane-
ous and graphic description of the events.
5 2 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 14, at 45; DICKSON, Op. Cit. supra note 32, § 391.
58Ibid. LEwIs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 215, gives these further examples of
improper questions: "Did the defender negligently run down the pursuer?"; "Did
the accused murder the deceased?"
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Counsel: What measures?
Pursuer: A guard rail could have been erected around the
staging.
The first two questions would almost certainly have been ob-
jected to by American lawyers and quite likely excluded by most of
our courts; they were framed literally in the terms of the statute which
created the duties allegedly breached by the defenders.5" It would be
difficult to find better examples of opinion testimony on the ultimate
issues for the jury. Here, however, unlike the area of leading ques-
tions, the Scots' liberality seemed to produce no unfavorable results.55
On the whole, the advocates' policy of interposing few objections
appeals to me. It achieves an effective and salutary liberalization of
the evidence rules at the trial level. However, restraint in raising
objections is a good substitute for genuine reform of the rules of
evidence only when counsel do not abruptly step out of character, and
only when the trial judge captures the spirit of tolerance. I think that
I should share with the reader the rather amazing case which provided
me with that insight.
It was a personal injury case, the first one that I observed which
involved the use of hospital records. I soon realized that both parties
were making perfectly free use of the pursuer's hospital records with
never an objection being interposed. First one witness and then
another would read, at the request of counsel for both parties, mis-
cellaneous excerpts from the records, including several items that would
not be admissible in this country under all of the hearsay exceptions
combined. I was soon convinced that by some marvelous statute or
decision, all entries in hospital records were admissible in Scotland to
prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. The case lasted just
5 "There shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be provided and maintained
safe means of access to every place at which any person has at any time to work,
and every such place shall, so far as is reasmoably practicable, be made and kept safe
for any person working there." Factories Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 34, §29(1).
(Emphasis added.)
t 5 My notes on the first case that I observed in Edinburgh contain another
example of practical liberality in the opinion rule area. The case involved an auto-
mobile accident. One of the witnesses was asked: "If the man had not run forward,
could the driver of the car have avoided him?" There was no objection, and the
answer was "Yes, definitely." Of course questions of that type are sometimes ap-
proved here, but they have been so often disapproved that Dean Wigmore once char-
acterized an Alabama case taking the liberal view as "indeed a Daniel come to judg-
ment, in comparison with other rulings .... " 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1976, at
123 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
The same case provided two other interesting items of testimony involving the
problem of a witness' opportunity to form a sound opinion. First, a police constable,
without objection, was permitted to express his opinion, based upon the odor of an
auto driver's breath, that the driver had had "several pints.' Later in the trial,
another witness, with similarly acute senses, was permitted to give his opinion of
the speed of an auto which he had not seen in motion, but whose tires (tyres in
Scotland) he had heard screeching on the roadway.
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under two days, and I suspect that half of the total bulk of the hospital
records of the pursuer had been read to the jury by the time the
defender rested his case. Both counsel made their dosing arguments,
and since I had by then gotten over my initial shock that hospital
records were so freely bandied about, I neither noted at the time nor
now remember how much reliance the advocates placed upon the hos-
pital records in their summaries. I am certain that both counsel
referred to the records to some extent. Just before the court was to
give instructions, the pursuer's counsel, to my utter amazement, moved
the court to instruct the jury to disregard every reference that had
been made to the pursuer's hospital records, except items that were
either admitted by the pursuer to be true, or testified to by the persons
who actually made the entries in question. My amazement turned to
despair when the judge excused the jury and asked for argument, and
then to something approaching grief when he granted the motion. The
judge granted that motion even though it was first made after final
arguments, even though the pursuer's counsel himself had elicited mat-
ters that did not meet his own now-expressed requirements for admissi-
bility, and even though he had failed to interpose a single objection to
the defender's use of the hospital records during the presentation of
evidence.
During the argument on the pursuer's motion, the judge ex-
pressed his frustration at this experience which apparently had oc-
curred in his court at least once before.56 He asked counsel how, in
future cases, they might avoid the situation of having all parties make
free use of hospital records and then having one party ask the judge at
the eleventh hour to take the inadmissible matters from the jury.
The defender's counsel deferentially suggested that some earlier objec-
tion might well have been taken by his opponent, but the argument
seemed to be lost on everyone in the courtroom except me. Of course,
the outcome of the case was not affected, because the judge gave the
requested instruction without emphasis and because the jury could not
B6 I have since learned that another Court of Session judge had made a formal
statement about this careless use of hospital records in a 1961 case.
The practice has grown up of recent years of parties admitting hospital
records. This practice is often for the convenience of the Court and avoids
the necessity of calling medical witnesses at personal inconvenience to identify
such records. To that extent the practice has much to commend it. If,
however, all that parties have agreed is that the records are records apper-
taining to the pursuer, such an agreement does not cover the facts contained
in the records and certainly does not cover expressions of medical opinion
therein. If, therefore, either party wishes to found on the facts contained in
the records, arrangements should be made with the other side to have the
facts admitted, and if such an arrangement cannot be made, someone from
the hospital staff with personal knowledge of the case should be adduced to
speak to the facts.
McHugh v. Leslie, 1961 ScoTs L.T. (Notes) 65 (Outer House).
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have followed it in any event. But the entire episode was incredible to
an American onlooker.
D. Jury Argument
In Scotland, the pursuer's counsel makes the first argument to
the jury, but does not present a rebuttal argument. This struck me
as being a significant difference between Scottish and American prac-
tice, since most trial lawyers attach some importance to having the
last word.
Two things about the manner in which advocates argue to the
juries caught my attention. First, the arguments of pursuers' advo-
cates seemed moderate and restrained to one who is accustomed to
American personal injury trials. This is partly attributable to the
Scottish rules about arguing damages which are far more restrictive
than the rules in many of our states; 57 but again tradition probably
plays a larger role.58 The concept of the "adequate award" " obviously
has not come to Edinburgh, and even an ex-defendants' lawyer is
tempted to say that counsel for pursuers undertry their cases. I might
add that the size of verdicts lends some support to this assertion.6'
The second thing that I noticed about the manner of arguing
applies to defenders as well as pursuers. This is entirely a subjective
reaction that should not be unduly emphasized, but it seemed to me
that there is a greater gulf between advocate and juror in Scotland
than between lawyer and juror in America. The ingredients of this
phenomenon, if it does exist outside of my own imagination, are the
wigs and gowns, the highly cultivated accent and tone of Edinburgh
advocates, and the natural tendency of most Scottish people to treat
each other with something less than the hale-fellow-well-met manner
of many Americans. Somehow I cannot imagine a Scottish advocate
57 Scottish advocates may not suggest to the jury formulae for computing amounts
or even total sums as awards for pain and suffering. In practice, they explain to
the jury that the total amount claimed in the pursuer's pleading was a purely artificial
maximum limit and that the jury should ignore that figure and return a moderate
and reasonable sum for pursuer's pain and suffering. For a good general discussion
of damages in personal injury cases, see WALxER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES IN SCOT-
LAND 578-81 (1955).
58 This same tradition of moderation and restraint is a noticeable feature of the
prosecutors' jury arguments in Scottish criminal cases. Allowing again for individual
differences among American prosecutors and among Scots, the manner of Scottish
prosecutors seems on the whole much less partisan than that of prosecutors in the
United States.
59 See Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CALIF. L. Rv. 1 (1951). See generally
BELLI MODERN DAMAGES (1959).
6o WALKER, op. cit. supra note 57, at 796, sets out, in an appendix, brief descrip-
tions of some 150 or so personal injury claims of the late 1940's and early 1950's,
and states the amount awarded in each case. The sums are quite modest by our
standards, even after allowance is made for national differences in the cost of living.
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getting "folksy" with a jury, perhaps permitting his speech to lapse
into the vernacular. This should not; however, be understood as a
criticism of the Scots, nor as a suggestion that jury argument is less
effective in Scotland than in this country. In fact, I was most favor-
ably impressed by the brevity and relevancy of the advocates' summa-
tions. Probably the dignity of wig, gown, cultivated speech, and that
certain aloofness is at least the equal of the rapport or identification of
the American trial lawyer with his jurors.
E. Instructions and Verdict
In his instruction to the jury, the Scottish judge is permitted to
comment on the evidence. In practice, this is handled with appropriate
moderation, but without squeamishness. A recent American study
of comment seems to show that it "make[s] the jury neither more nor
less like the judge." "' If this is so, arguably we should omit judicial
comment in all cases, in the interest of saving time. On the other
hand, if comment has no prejudicial effect, it seems needless, and
costly from the standpoint of appeals, to require trial judges to avoid
it circumspectly in those cases in which some sort of summary or
review of the evidence is needed or perhaps even requested by the jury.
In certain areas of jury instruction, the Scots have achieved a
clarity that has eluded us in this country. When instructing on the
burden of proof in civil cases, for example, Scottish courts properly
focus the jurors' attention on their own state of mind rather than on
a mechanical weighing of evidence in search of a preponderance. "The
pursuer has the burden to satisfy you by the balance of probabilities
. ... " The "satisfy you" clause reminds me of the Alabama
formula-reasonably satisfy-to which I became accustomed in prac-
tice and which has Professor McCormick's approval.62 The "proba-
bilities" aspect of the Scottish instruction fits in reasonably well,
though not perfectly, with the recommendations of one of our most
thoughtful commentators.6 Certainly from the standpoint of common
sense, satisfaction on probabilities is more descriptive of what we are
after than proof by the "greater weight" of evidence or any other
such formula.
Another instance of simple clarity in Scottish jury instructions
occurs in the "Issue for the Pursuer," submitted to the jury in every
6 1 JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 214 (1962), quoting Kalven, Report
on the Jury Project, in CON ECE ON Aims AND M oDs OF LWAL RESECH
(Conard ed. 1955).
62McCopmIcK, EvmENcE § 319, at 678 (1954).
63 MeBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALXw. L. REv. 242, 246-50
(1944).
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negligence case, and the "Counter-Issue for the Defender," submitted
when the defender alleges contributory negligence. By the former,
the jury is asked whether the pursuer's injuries were caused to any
extent by the "fault of the defender"; by the latter, whether to any
extent by the "fault of the pursuer." How refreshing it was to hear
juries questioned in terms simply of "fault," which every juror under-
stands, rather than burdened with such mishmash as "failure to exer-
cise the care of a reasonably prudent man." In sum, I found that
instructions to the jury in the Scottish cases that I observed were
briefer, more pungent, and more helpful to the jury than instructions
usually given in this country.
Now that we have the Scottish civil case in the hands of the
jury, there is but one further contrast to describe. In both civil and
criminal cases in Scotland, a verdict may be found by a simple majority
of the jury.84  Probably the ideal lies somewhere between the Scottish
simple majority and the American unanimous verdict,", but I should
be sorely tempted to settle for the simple majority in civil cases. In
Edinburgh, when the jury go out at noon, one can wait for the verdict
and not miss lunch!
64 Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 41, § 11.
65 "Deliberation so essential to good decision-making and fact-finding does not
require unanimity. However, it does require more than a majority verdict, for the
give-and-take of discussion is essential." JOINER, op. cit. supra note 61, at 82. See
also id. at 201-02, quoting Kalven, supra note 61.
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